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I. INTRODUCTION
In a sparkling display of criminal ineptitude, a suspected drug dealer turned
himself in without even realizing it. The bungling began when the witless
outlaw misdialed the phone number of his alleged accomplice, choosing instead
to leave a message detailing his whereabouts on the answering machine of a
local police officer. He performed this fatal miscue several times on a machine
whose recording clearly indicated that it belonged to a local police officer. His
telephone finale involved his dialing the car phone of his alleged accomplice,
only this time it was answered by police officers who listened to the doomed
drug dealer describe his whereabouts.' Though refreshing, it is clear that most
criminals are not as cooperative with their local police force.
Crimes on the order of drug trafficking, gambling, and prostitution, among
others, involve "consensual" transactions. These transactions present special
difficulties for police officers to detect because they are generally performed in
private between willing participants who rarely complain to the police. In an
era in which criminal justice legislation looks to impose itself on the private
activities of American citizens with increasing frequency and moralistic
altruism, the burden on law enforcement agencies grows accordingly.
In most jurisdictions, the police have accepted the challenge these
clandestine crimes present by developing creative forms of detection. Law
enforcement agencies frequently employ undercover agents and informants in
their effort to expose consensual crimes. These agents seek to expose the
criminals through an often complicated drama of bait and lure solicitation.
These stratagems raise new questions in criminal law, including whether the
person who was solicited would have, of their own free will, participated in the
criminal offense absent the solicitation by the law enforcement agents. This
question, in multiple forms, represents the core of the entrapment defense.
Malcolm X, a provocative voice in the battle for civil rights, was brutally
assassinated in New York's Audubon Ballroom one frigid winter evening in
1965. As is generally the case, the assassins left indistinct trails, rendering the
case unsolved thirty years later. A legacy from that period is the daughter of
Malcolm X, Qubilah Bahiyah Shabazz, who has been forced to live each day
among her father's suspected assassins-burdened with the memory of his
* The author wishes to thank the members of his family for their enduring support and
encouragement.1Lucy Howard & Carla Koehl, Dwnb and.. ., NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1995, at 6.
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death. Imagine the anguish when, wholly unsolicited, one of her most admired
friends offers her an opportunity for vengeance.2 Certainly surprised, possibly
taken aback, she concedes to listen to his plan. By listening, it could be argued
that she has satisfied a deeply ingrained obligation to provide retribution for her
slain father, without having previously or seriously considered its
accomplishment. After all, this was a trusted friend who had approached her,
not a bounty hunter off the set of a Martin Scorcese film. In a well conceived
"sting" operation, Ms. Shabazz is arrested for conspiring to murder Louis
Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam and rumored conspirator in the
assassination of Malcolm X. The legal questions automatically develop from
this stage: What is the informant's relationship with the government? Was he
paid for the information or in some way compensated for his actions?
Assuming he is affiliated with the government, was Ms. Shabazz entrapped,
were her due process rights infringed, or did his actions simply provide an
innocent spark to a seething powder keg?
Courts have long recognized the need for a criminal defense that endeavors
to draw a line "between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal." 3 Very quickly, the defense swept across the American legal
system as the courts acknowledged that "[h]uman nature is frail enough at best,
and requires no encouragement in wrong-doing." 4
This Note will analyze the role the Constitution plays in the development
of these defenses, paying particular attention to the "outrageous governmental
conduct" defense of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-a close
relative of the entrapment defense. A recent Sixth Circuit decision5 has
proclaimed the death knell of this "due process" defense, finding no
constitutional foundation to support the defense.6 This Note will reveal the
logical inconsistency of this decision and argue that the postulated demise of the
due process defense is unjustified.
First, a foundation is laid through a detailed analysis of the entrapment
defense by examining the debate embroiling both the subjective and objective
applications of the defense. Although the subjective approach has been favored
by the Supreme Court in these matters, a look to the recent decision of
Jacobson v. United States7 will expose the inherent flaws of a strict adherence
to the subjective methodology. Next, after developing a comparison of the
2 Tom Morganthau, Back in the Line of Fire, NEWSWEEK, jan. 23, 1995, at 20.
3 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (Warren, CJ.).
4 Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878) (Marston, J., concurring).
5 United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994), cen. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426
(1995).
6 Id. at 1424.
7 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
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outrageous governmental conduct defense to that of entrapment, this Note will
explore the arguments used by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Thcker8 in
support of its decision to dismiss altogether the outrageous governmental
conduct defense from Sixth Circuit consideration. This Note will follow this
analysis by proposing new arguments which will warrant the constitutional
integrity of the outrageous governmental conduct defense. Finally, this Note
will look to the future of the American criminal justice system as incorporated
with a valid due process defense.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ENTRAPMENT AS A VIABLE
DEFENSE
A. The Function of the Entrapment Defense
The term "entrapment" brings to mind images of a wild fox or bear
ensnared in a menacing, bonecrushing metal trap. For legal purposes,
entrapment signifies "instigation of crime by officers of government." 9 It has
further been defined as "the inducement by government, of an individual to
commit a criminal offense, not contemplated by him, for the purpose of
prosecution." 10 It seems clear that entrapment "occurs only when the criminal
conduct was 'the product of the creative activity' of law-enforcement
officials.",,
The absence of entrapment is not an element of the prima facie case of any
crime. This defense is utilized as an affirmative defense, that is, one in which
the alleged crime is excused due to some "compelling reason." 12 The
compelling reason generally takes the form of an excuse or justification of that
crime. 13 Examples of other affirmative defenses include self-defense, insanity,
and duress. It is important to keep in mind that while these may be effective in
reducing the degree of the crime committed, they are not always effective in
unconditionally absolving the defendant of responsibility. Because entrapment
is difficult to comfortably identify with other forms of affirmative defenses,
combined with the fact that this defense implicates the government-through its
agents-in criminal activity, it is inherently a controversial proposition.
8 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
9 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., separate opinion).10 State v. Marquardt, 89 A.2d 219, 221 (Conn. 1952).
11 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
451).12 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTt, JR., CRmcNAL LAW § 5.2,




B. The Application of the Entrapment Defense: Subjective v. Objective
Analysis
The Supreme Court has been sharply divided in its attempt to identify a
uniform criterion for application of the defense. 14 The dispute arises from the
inability of the Justices to agree on a proper controlling standard: The majority
insists on a test which focuses on the predisposition of the defendant to commit
the offense of which he stands charged (the subjective test),15 while a
substantial minority contends that the test should concentrate solely on the
conduct of the law enforcement agents (the objective test).16
The subjective approach, also known as the Sorrells-Sherman Doctrine' 7-
advocated by a majority of the Supreme Courtl8-requires a two-pronged
inquiry. In using such an analysis, the court would begin by assessing whether
the government agents induced the defendant to commit the crime for which he
is accused. 19 If this assertion can be made, the court must then make a
subjective examination of the defendant's predisposition to commit the
offense.20 Under the subjective test, if a finding of predisposition is made, the
defense will fail, 21 without regard to the degree of misconduct perpetrated by
the government agents.22 The subjective analysis, as developed in Sorrells v.
United States,23 and reaffirmed in Sherman v. United States,24 permits the
application of the entrapment defense only when government agents induce
otherwise innocent persons-both in mind as well as in action-to commit a
crime.25
Justification for the subjective approach finds its genesis in statutory
principles. The basis of the defense is understood in terms of legislative intent
14 See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 435.
15 See, e.g., Shernun, 356 U.S. at 376-78; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
16 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-30 (1973).17 Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: Towards a
More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1064 (Winter
1993).
18 Serman, 356 U.S. at 369; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 435.
19 Shenman, 356 U.S. at 371; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 438.
20 See also Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90; Rusell, 411 U.S. at 435-36; Shema, 356
U.S. at 371; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
21 S tenan, 356 U.S. at 371; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
22 United States v. Rodrigues, 433 F.2d 760, 761 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub
nom Rodriguez v. United States, 401 U.S. 943 (1971).
23 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
24 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
25 iememan, 356 U.S. at 372; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
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underlying the particular statute alleged to have been violated.26 The Court in
Sorrells based its decision in part on the belief that the evidence supported the
defendant's claim that he was not predisposed to commit the crime prior to his
encounter with the police agents. 27 Without the required predisposition, the
Court would not convict the defendant. The Court reasoned that it could not
have been the intent of the Legislature to enforce the statute against "persons
otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish
them." 28
Under the subjective analysis, the focus of the inquiry will be on the
character of the defendant and his predisposition to commit the crime in
question, not on the offensive governmental conduct.29 The subjective analysis
provides two reasons to oppose the use of entrapment on the part of
government officials: (1) criminal legislation is not targeted at nonpredisposed
parties; and (2) it is not within the power of government officials to
manufacture crime by involving otherwise innocent people in criminal
activities.
The objective approach for entrapment, as surmised by Justice Roberts in
Sorrells,30 and by Justice Frankfurter in Sherman,31 rejects the legislative-
intent rationale of the subjective analysis. 32 These Justices proposed a test
26 SNman, 356 U.S. at 372.
27 With regard to predisposition, the majority established that:
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for
which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was the
creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it but was
an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise
innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent solicitation in which he
succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their
experiences as companions in arms in the World War.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.28 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 449. In Sherman, Chief Justice Warren later clarified:
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to
overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not
only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the habit of use....
Mhe Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376.
29 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1976); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435-36 (1973); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
30 287 U.S. at 453 (Roberts, I., separate opinion).
31 356 U.S. at 378 (Frankfurter, I., concurring in the result).
32 d.; Sorre//s, 287 U.S. at 453.
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which places emphasis on the extent of governmental misconduct as the focal
point of its inquiry.33 Justice Frankfurter observes in Sherman that a criminal
statute is concerned exclusively with the definition and prohibition of certain
conduct, not expressing prohibitive police conduct in the process of detecting
crime.34
Justice Frankfurter revealed other critical dangers of a subjective
assessment. The Federal Rules of Evidence seek to protect the defendant from
unnecessary exposure to juror prejudice.35 Frankfurter notes that the
government, in order to prove that it had not entrapped the accused, would be
compelled to demonstrate a general predisposition on the part of the defendant
"to commit, whenever the opportunity should arise, crimes of the kindSolicited .. .. "-36
By the 1988 decision of Mathews v. United States,37 the Supreme Court
had clearly established its preference for the subjective approach to entrapment
analysis. Justice Brennan, a stalwart proponent of an objective approach in
earlier decisions,38 retracted this earlier support in clear deference to the
dominance of the Court's preference for subjective entrapment analysis. 39
3 3 Hwpton, 425 U.S. at 488-89; Russell, 411 U.S. at 428-30.
3 4 lustice Frankfurter comments:
A false choice is put when it is said that either the defendant's conduct does not fall
within the statute or he must be convicted. The statute is wholly directed to defining and
prohibiting the substantive offense concerned and expresses no purpose, either
permissive or prohibitory, regarding the police conduct that will be tolerated in the
detection of crime. A statute prohibiting the sale of narcotics is as silent on the question
of entrapment as it is on the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. It is enacted,
however, on the basis of certain presuppositions concerning the established legal order
and the role of the courts within that system in formulating standards for the
administration of criminal justice when Congress itself has not specifically legislated to
that end.
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 381 (Frankfinrer, I., concurring in the result).
3 5 See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 406 (discussing the admissibility of character evidence to
prove the conduct of a person on a particular occasion).
3 6 Justice Frankfurter continued: "The defendant must either forego the claim of
entrapment or run the substantial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a
criminal record or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt... ." Sherman, 356
U.S. at 382 (Frankfurter, I., concurring in the result).
37 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
38 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 436; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378.
3 9 Austice Brennan conceded:
Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the view that the
entrapment defense should focus exclusively on the Government's conduct. But I am
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It is clear that these distinct approaches may differ as much in result as in
their theoretical underpinnings. Take, for example, a person X who is a student
in a large university. X, short on funds for the semester, decides that he will
take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself, legal or otherwise, which
will help pay his bills. X is approached by an undercover agent who cautiously
introduces him to the idea of distributing illegal narcotics. X is promised
exorbitant profits and a minimum of vulnerability. X, though privately
interested, hesitates for a number of days in order to ensure the deal's
legitimacy. In the interim, the agent puts a tremendous amount of pressure on
X to begin distribution by calling him frequently, leaving threatening notes,
implying that X already knows too much about their operation to back out of
the deal. When X complies, he is immediately arrested.
Under this scenario, an argument could be made against applying the
entrapment defense under the subjective theory. Proponents of the subjective
theory would argue that the defendant's predisposition to commit the illegal act
burdens him with criminal liability, without regard to the aggressive methods
of the police. Objective theory proponents would argue that the irrelevant issue
is this very predisposition. Rather, the focus should be on the conduct of the
police.4° If the conduct is overbearing, the entrapment defense should provide
an absolute defense.
Despite the above example, it is important to note that at its core, the
difference between the subjective and objective tests for entrapment is one of
theory. By creating a statutory premise for entrapment, we risk losing sight of
the true function of the doctrine, which is to absolve an otherwise guilty
individual who has been induced to commit a crime by law enforcement
methods that are unacceptable.
III. OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT AND TiE DUE PROCESS
DEFENSE
Little challenge can be made against the notion that the administration of
criminal law is one of the government's most important, and potentially most
intrusive powers. On this note, it is clear that each society must meet its
responsibility in preventing the overextension of this power. American society
has sought to meet these responsibilities by providing for an accusatorial
not writing on a clean slate; the Court has spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I
bow to stare decisis, and today join the judgment and reasoning of the Court.
Mathews, 485 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, I., concurring).
40 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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system premised on the presumption of innocence,41 the requirement of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, 42 and the requirement that the State shoulder the
burden of proof.43 The concept of substantive due process serves as the
system's most important tool in the pursuit of equilibrium of power.
While providing a comprehensive system of personal liberties, due process
seeks to determine what is "fundamentally fair" by scrutinizing all of the
circumstances surrounding each event.44 Implementation of due process
principles requires freedom from arbitrary behavior and deceitful practices by
the government. 45 The focus on individual rights is enhanced even more
substantially when considering the individual with respect to criminal
investigations. Due process serves as the counterbalance in this fertile ground
for abuse, providing for a fair fight in the nation's courts.46 From this point in
the analysis, it seems a logical conclusion that due process would serve an
equally crucial role in the enforcement division of the criminal justice system.
The concept of due process adds the component of justice and fairness to
criminal proceedings, even if those charged are predisposed to crime. Its
protections extend beyond the subjective principles of entrapment, instead
imposing a burden solely on the government to treat its citizens, irrespective of
criminal propensity, guilt, or innocence, with dignity and fairness. 47
IV. A SEVERE CHALLENGE TO THE "OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENTAL
CONDUCT" DEFENSE: UNITED STATES V. 7CKER
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the
outrageous governmental conduct defense most recently in its 1994 decision of
United States v. Tucker.48 In Tucker, the Sixth Circuit held that the government
does not violate due process by inducing a predisposed defendant to commit an
offense, regardless of whether the government's conduct is objectively
outrageous.49
41 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978).
42 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
43 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
44 See Shernan, 356 U.S. at 384-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
45 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952).
46 Edward G. Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Right to Appointed Counsel
in Qvil Contempt Proceedings, 5 W. NEwENG. L. REv. 601, 612-13 (1983).
4 7 Id.
48 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).




Linda Hancock was hired by the United States Department of Agriculture
to curb the preponderance of abuse to the federal food stamp system.50 A
"reverse sting"-a method of investigation in which "the police pose as sellers
of [contraband], set up deals with would-be buyers under carefully controlled
conditions, and arrest the purchasers following the sham sale"-was
employed. 51 In 1990, Hancock appealed to defendant Tucker, a friend of more
than ten years, to help her escape dire financial problems.52 She proposed
selling her family's food stamps in order to provide a "proper Christmas" for
her children. 53 At first Tucker resisted, however, she "finally purchased the
stamps when Hancock later appeared at her beauty salon dressed in a manner
suggesting her financial distress." 54 Hancock asked Tucker for names of other
people who might be interested in purchasing some stamps, to which Tucker
replied by directing her to McDonald, one of Tucker's employees. 55 McDonald
also bought stamps from Hancock after listening to her tales of ill-health and
financial distress. 56
B. The Procedural History
The government indicted Brenda Tucker and Barbara McDonald for
purchasing and aiding and abetting the purchase of food stamps in violation of
federal law.57 The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that
the government's conduct in inducing defendants to commit their crimes was so
"outrageous" that it violated their due process rights. 58 Upon the
recommendation of the magistrate, the district court dismissed the charges. 59
Upon appeal by the Government, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
this decision de novo. 60
50 Id. at 1421.






57 Id. (charging specifically a violation of 7 U.S.C. §2024(b)(1) (1994)).
58 Id.
59 Id.60 Id. The Government's appeal was brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994).
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C. The Plurality Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the court held that the due process defense of
outrageous governmental conduct lacked the requisite foundation in law and
consequently should no longer be recognized as a valid defense in any Sixth
Circuit proceeding. Although Judge Martin ultimately held that the outrageous
governmental defense would not apply under the circumstances of this case, he
did file a separate opinion to voice his support for the defense.61
The court began its survey of the outrageous governmental conduct defense
where most inquiries of this kind begin, with entrapment. Following a
discussion of Sorrells and Sherman, the court surmised that the Supreme Court
has indicated a clear predilection for the subjective analysis of the entrapment
defense.62 Accordingly, where a defendant's "predisposition to commit a
particular crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, [he would] not [be
permitted to] defend against prosecution on the basis that the government
induced him to commit that crime, no matter how strong the inducement or
'outrageous' the government's conduct." 63
The court acknowledged that in another case, United States v. Russell,64
the defendant proposed an argument for an entrapment defense based on
constitutional principles of due process instead of congressional intent.65 The
Russell Court held, the Sixth Circuit continued, that the government's conduct
did not violate an independent constitutional right.66 Because the defense of
entrapment lacked all constitutional foundation, the court failed to recognize
any analogy to Fourth Amendment analyses. 67
In concluding that the Russell decision could not support the outrageous
governmental conduct defense, the Sixth Circuit had to address Justice
Rehnquist's concession, in dicta, of the defense's potential existence.68 As an
61Id. at 1429.
62 Id. at 1422.
63 Id.
64 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
65 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1422.
66 Id.
67 Id at 1423.
68 The court addressed it as follows:
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.... the instant
1580 [Vol. 56:1571
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aid to this inquiry, the circuit court looked to Rehnquist's attempt to rectify the
inherent inconsistencies within his position in his plurality opinion of Hampton
v. United States.69 His attempt, relegated to dicta by the facts of the case, failed
to receive a majority because five Justices specifically refused to dismiss the
defense altogether. 70
The court looked to its own opinion in United States v. Leja7' and
concluded that the Sixth Circuit lacked substantial precedent to recognize the
defense. As in Russell, the court in Leja refused to admit the due process
defense absent an independent constitutional violation. Rather than rejecting the
due process defense on a per se basis, the court held that "as long as the
potential for abuse of individual rights exists," 72 the potential to invoke the due
process defense must remain as a guarantor of these rights. The court
emphasized that in over two dozen cases since Leja, the Sixth Circuit has
refused to accept the due process defense "on the facts" in every case.73 The
Tucker court concluded, despite the repeated recognition (if not
implementation) of the due process defense, that there was no authority in the
Sixth Circuit upon which it could recognize a defense based on the Fifth
Amendment. This defense would have provided Fifth Amendment protection
against governmental conduct in inducing the commission of a crime, if
outrageous enough, by prohibiting prosecution of an otherwise predisposed
defendant. 74
case is distinctly not of that breed.... The law enforcement conduct here stops far
short of violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,"
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32 (quoting Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)).
This dicta has been cited more than two hundred times as authority for a defense based
solely on an objective assessment of the government's conduct.
69 425 U.S. 484, 489 (1976) (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist further noted: "The
limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only when the
government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant." Id. at 490.
70 Two Justices in dicta (Powell and Blackmun) and three in dissent (Brennan, Stewart,
and Marshall).
71 563 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978).
72 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1424 (citing Leja, 563 F.2d at 247).
73 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1110-11 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1098 (1986); United States v. Norton, 700 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 910 (1983); United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1980).
74 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1424.
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In addition, the Sixth Circuit conducted a survey of other circuits in search
of authority for the defense.75 The court acknowledged a general recognition of
the defense among other circuits. 76 However, with one seemingly
inconsequential exception,77 a proper fact scenario never seemed deserving of
the defense.
Moreover, the court assumed that the possible violation of separation of
powers inherent in the defense,78 along with the inescapable subjectivity of any
"objective" determination of "outrageousness." 79 Both strongly support
disowning the defense altogether.
After considerable discussion, the circuit court held that it was not required
to recognize the due process defense.80 Three final arguments sealed the matter
for the plurality. First, any "government conduct which induces a defendant to
commit a crime, even if labeled 'outrageous,' does not violate that defendant's
constitutional right of due process."81 Second, "the district court lacked
authority to dismiss the indictment for governmental misconduct where no
violation of an independent constitutional right has been shown."82 Finally,
"continued recognition of [the due process] defense stands as an invitation to
75 Id. at 1425-26.
76 Id.
77 Id. (pointing to United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), as the
exception). In Tucker, the court elaborated on the anomaly, stating that this decision was
subsequently disavowed by the Third Circuit for improperly relying on United States v.
West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975), which had been limited by Hampton and other Third
Circuit opinions. See United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 12 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 610 n.17 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982)).
78 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1426.
79 Id.80 Id.
81 Id. at 1427. This argument is based on recognizing the close relationship of the
entrapment defense to the "due process" defense. Since the Supreme Court has held that the
entrapment defense finds its basis in legislative intent, as opposed to the Constitution, the
Congress could decide to dismiss this defense. This would mean that even those defendants
who were induced to commit a crime and who were not predisposed to commit that crime
(generally protected by the current entrapment defense) could be convicted without violating
due process.
82 Id. This conclusion is based on the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). The Supreme Court held in Payner that even if an unlawful
search were so outrageous as to offend a fundamental fairness, "'[tihe limitations of the Due
Process Clause... come into play only when the Government activity in question violates
some protected right of the defendant.'" Payner, 447 U.S. at 737 n.9 (quoting Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion)) (alterations in original). From
this, the court infers that the balance to be struck between government overreaching and the
need to prevent lawlessness can only be found at predisposition, not "outrageousness."
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violate the constitutional separation of powers, intruding not only on the
province of the Executive Branch but the Legislative Branch as well." 83 On
this basis, the affirmative defense offered by the defendants in 7cker was
rejected as a matter of law.8 4 It was no longer necessary to determine whether,
on the facts, the conduct of the government officials was "outrageous." 85
D. Judge Martin's Concurrence
It is important to note that Judge Martin, though concurring in the result,
refused to reject the existence of the due process defense. He felt obligated to
recognize it as a legitimate defense given the precedent within the Sixth Circuit.
He even reiterated the Sixth Circuit's test for determining outrageous
conduct,86 before conceding that in this particular case, the defense simply did
not meet the test's burden of proof to show that the conduct was outrageous.
V. IN SUPPORT OF THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT
DEFENSE
Justice Roberts argued in Sorrells that the doctrine of entrapment must be
rooted "in the public policy which protects the purity of government and its
processes"87 which necessarily closes the courts "to the trial of a crime
83 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1427. The relevant question in this analysis is which branch
should label and control "outrageous governmental conduct" with regard to criminal law
enforcement. Because the subjective predisposition of the defendant crosses the threshold
from society's desire to prevent outrageous governmental conduct into society's desire to
punish those who commit crimes, the objective test should be rejected. The court concluded
that unless a specific law is broken or a constitutional right is trampled, each court may only
look to those factors provided by Congress, on the defendant's predisposition.
84 Id. at 1428.
85 Id. at 1429 (Martin, I., concurring). Judge Martin's concurrence reads more like a
dissent: "I believe that this panel is bound by prior Sixth Circuit decisions recognizing the
existence of an 'outrageous government conduct' defense, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, to criminal prosecution. I concur in the result, nevertheless, because
the government's conduct in the present case was not outrageous." Id.
86 The test has four factors:
(1) the need for the police conduct as shown by the type of criminal activity involved,
(2) the impetus for the scheme or whether the criminal enterprise preexisted the police
involvement, (3) the control the government exerted over the criminal enterprise, and
(4) the impact of the police activity on the commission of the crime.
Id. 87 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (Roberts, I., separate opinion).
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instigated by the government's own agents." 88 Justice Roberts continued by
indicating that courts have "the inherent right.., not to be made the
instrument of wrong." 89 From this perspective, Justice Roberts does not find it
necessary to decide between guilt and innocence; rather, the important issue is
"the public policy which protects the purity of government." 90
Justice Frankfurter, in Sherman, continued this reasoning by arguing that
to ensure the objective regulation of law enforcement conduct in apprehending
those "ready and willing to commit crime," an analysis of the predisposition of
the accused would fail to ascertain the reasonableness of the police conduct.91
The proper focus can only be on the conduct of the government agents.92
Frankfurter concluded that it was not the function of government "to promote
[crime, but] rather [to] detect crime and to bring about the downfall of those
who, left to themselves, might well have obeyed the law.... Human nature is
weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government adding
to them and generating crime." 93
Both Justices Roberts and Frankfurter base their positions on a crucial
element, the recognition that the threat posed to the integrity of both the
criminal law and the judicial process is found in the conduct of the government,
not the actions of the defendant. 94 At the base of this theory is the notion that
judicial authority should not be used for the enforcement of the criminal law by
means that are unjust. 95 This theory is grounded in the policy of judicial
integrity.96 The goal is similar to those instituted by the Federal Rules of
Evidence: it is better to set a criminal free, so long as the laws that justify the
system maintain their integrity.97 It is crucial to remember that the laws of this
88 Id. at 459.
89 Id. at 456.
9 0 Id. at 455.
91 Sheman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 l at 385; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
95 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456-58 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).9 6 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380, 385 (Frankfurter, I., concurring in the result); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); id at 470 (Holmes, I., dissenting).9 7 FED. R. EviD. 102. This idea is most easily exemplified by comparing the standard
of persuasion necessary for conviction in a criminal case to the standard required in most
civil cases. In most civil cases, the standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence
indicates a policy decision which would allow any case to turn on a finding of 51%-49% in
favor or against any party. However, in criminal cases, the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is notably more demanding. This standard represents a policy decision in
favor of risking the acquittal of a defendant who is more than likely guilty of the crime for
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country were designed to protect all of us-the innocent as well as the guilty-
from rule by tyranny. 98 This standard stems from one of the most basic
precepts of the American legal institution, that we live under "a government of
laws, and not of men." 99
The administration of the criminal law has been described as the "most
awesome aspect of government."" 0 Consequently, a clear signal of an
advanced and well-adjusted society is a sophisticated, yet highly impartial,
system of criminal law enforcement. Of manifest importance, government
agents should not themselves become criminals as they seek, no matter how
reasonable or praiseworthy, to fight crime. 1' From these authorities, the
conclusion may be drawn that a preeminent duty of government in a
progressive society, from both a legal and moral standpoint, is to enforce its
criminal laws within strict boundaries of justice and fairness, cognizant always
of the approved standards of conduct.
A serious discussion of entrapment and the due process defenses cannot
ignore the ever-rising tide of sophisticated, as well as concealed, crime. 102 To
combat these increasingly dire circumstances, the police are forced to turn to
clandestine investigation methods of their own, utilizing informants and
undercover agents wherever possible.' 0 3 Subsequently, the defense of
entrapment may not call for the cessation of legal proceedings where the
government resorted to deceit' 4 or obtained "evidence by artifice or
deception." 10 5
Although a modem law enforcement agency cannot ignore the usefulness
of covert operations in their battle to keep pace with sophisticated crime
networks, the fact remains that a democratically functioning government must
acknowledge definite constraints on these powers. The courts must be prepared
which he is charged. So long as the evidence raises just enough doubt in a juror's mind that
one element of the crime has not been fulfilled, his acquittal is secured.
98 Cx _o-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (stating that
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures "protects all,
those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the innocent").
99 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
100 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 (1946) (Frankfurter, I., concurring).
101 See also Sheran, 356 U.S. at 372 (majority opinion) (stating that although it is the
function of law enforcement to prevent crime and apprehend criminals, "[m]anifestly, that
function does not include the manufacturing of crime").
102 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring
in the judgment).
103 See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-54 (Roberts, J., separate
opinion).104 Rusell, 411 U.S. at 435-36.
105 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454 (Roberts, J., separate opinion).
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to define these boundaries, providing law enforcement agencies with guidelines
as to when "enough is more than enough-it is just too much. When that
occurs, the law must condemn it as offensive [to due process] whether the
method used is refined or crude, subtle or spectacular." 106 When this boundary
has been crossed by any method of official conduct, due process must step in,
as is its purpose, to prevent any "prosecution conceived in or nurtured by such
[outrageous] conduct." 10 7
For Justice Holmes, the fact that evidence would be excluded for having
been obtained by unconstitutional means seemed to provide for the logical
extension of inadmissibility for having been obtained by illegal acts of
government agents.108 This approach is yet another expression of the American
criminal law principle that it is better to choose as "a less[er] evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble
part."109
A. The Due Process Defense Differentiated from Entrapment
The function of the due process defense is to place both federal and state
law enforcement agencies under a uniform duty to satisfy certain standards of
decency and fair play in their investigation and apprehension of criminals.110
Although the due process defense is "a close relative of entrapment," it is
independent.111 The unique structure of this defense, bound by the
Constitution, will require uniform application to all suspects: the innocent, the
guilty, and the criminally predisposed. This application will resolve and
displace the deficiencies of the subjective analysis for entrapment.
The most important discrepancy between the entrapment and due process
defenses is the availability to those criminally predisposed. In addition, the due
process defense provides protections beyond those provided by entrapment" 2
106 Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, I.,
concurring specially), ovemded by United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 316
(5th Cir. 1987).107 People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (N.Y. 1978).
108 Obmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, L, dissenting).
109 Id.
110 nman, 356 U.S. at 384.
111 United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983).
112 See United States v. jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 606 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (stating that "a
successful due process defense must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which




by reaching "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime [which attains] a demonstrable
level of outrageousness" 1 3 that will agitate a sense of justice.
B. ConstitutionalAuthority
Due process, as a restraint on the power of government to use the judiciary
as a tool to enforce the criminal code, has been sanctioned as early as the
Magna Carta.114 Archetypal of this standard is when government agents
brutalize a defendant in order to obtain evidence to aid in his conviction. This
type of activity clearly goes beyond offending "some fastidious squeamishness
or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically."' 15 Rather,
"[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience." 116 A conviction supported by
this evidence would offend our sense of justice and fair play, crucial
components of our society.
C. Application of the Defense
The Tucker court argues that the fine lines that must be drawn when the
predisposition of the accused is ignored in favor of an assessment of the
government agent's conduct will create insurmountable practical difficulties. 117
It is conceded that this argument raises legitimate issues, however, it must be
kept in mind that at stake is a delineation of fundamental rights as they exist at
particular times, places, and within particular contexts. This is a responsibility
which the Constitution's founders must have had in mind when they provided
for the creation of a federal judiciary. The issue of whether specific
governmental conduct violates due process must turn on "the totality of the
circumstances with no single factor controlling." 18 We cannot, nor should we,
expect this analysis to provide a "precise line of demarcation or calibrated
measuring rod with a mathematical solution." 119
The courts are uniquely equipped to sift through the competing interests of
the government (to detect and punish criminals) and of individuals (to be
treated fairly within a framework of justice and decency). The judiciary stands
as the most qualified branch of government to make these difficult decisions. A
113 Hwton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
114 People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 82 (N.Y. 1978).
115 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).116 Id.
117 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1426 (refering to the unavoidable subjectivity to which any
purportedly objective assessment of "outrageousness" must devolve).
118 United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir. 1981); Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d
at 83.
119 Isaacon, 378 N.E.2d at 83.
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defendant who has been victimized by police misconduct that involves
government participation in criminal activity to an unconscionable degree 120
should be able to resort to the courts and the due process or outrageous police
conduct defense.
It is possible to develop guidelines for application of the defense which will
promote its uniform application. Factors worth consideration include: (1) a
dominant motive by the police to secure the conviction, without regard for
normal procedure; (2) tenacious efforts by the police to wear down the
resistance of the suspect, thus inducing the suspect into criminal activity he
otherwise would not have pursued; and (3) the control of criminal activity by
government agents that unreasonably exceeds the level of activity necessary to
detect and contain criminals. 121
Justice Rehnquist suggests that any police officer engaging in such illegal
activity or other activity outside the scope of duty be prosecuted under
applicable federal or state law.122 This simply is not adequate. There are two
independent elements at work: vindication of the Constitution and preservation
of the judicial system itself.123 Beyond the constitutional issues lies the goal of
"the purity of [the courts'] own temple." 124 Simply prosecuting the police
under a separate statute will not preserve this fundamental element of the
American judicial system. Once a government agent commits an act that is
repugnant to the principles embedded in the Due Process Clause, the issue has
gone beyond retribution against the officer. Instead, it is the respect for the
criminal law system and the faith in the protections provided by the
Constitution that deserve foremost attention.
VI. THE DUE PRocEss DEFENSE AS AN INDEPENDENT PROTECTION FROM
GOVERNMENT-INDUCED CRIMINALITY
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Russell,125 implied through dictum
the existence of the due process defense.' 2 6 In so doing, the Court supported
120 Id.
121 United States V. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983); Isaacson, 378
N.E.2d at 83.122 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
123 Sorre//s, 287 U.S. at 457.
124 Id.
125 411 US. 423 (1973).
126 Id. at 431-32 (hypothesizing that "we may some day be presented with a situation
in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles




this proposition by citing Rochin v. CaiforZia,127 which involved the forcible
extraction of evidence-by way of a stomach pump-from the defendant's body
by methods that "shock[ed] the conscience"' 28 of the Court.
In United States v. Archer,129 the Government argued that the reference in
Russell to Rochin confirmed that the Supreme Court perceives the due process
defense as one limited to conduct which shocks the conscience of a court and
directly infringes on the rights of a defendant.130 The Second Circuit did not
find it necessary to answer this question since the dispute in Archer could be
resolved on other grounds. Nonetheless, the court seemed to adopt a broader
application of the defense-a general due process right "of citizens to be free
from government-induced criminality"l3l-than that proposed by the
Government. 232
The Supreme Court has taken only one opportunity, Hampton v. United
States,133 to address the limits of the due process defense. In Hampton, a
plurality of the Court appeared to implicitly reject the defense, limiting its
application to direct infringements of the rights of defendants.1 34
The Tucker court argues that the effect of requiring direct infringement of
the rights of defendants before the defense is triggered effectively dismisses the
defense from consideration.' 35 There are two compelling arguments in support
of continued recognition of the defense. First, it is clear that the plurality in
Hampton did not intend to deprive the accused of all protection. However, by
disposing of the due process defense altogether, this would certainly be the
indirect effect. This is the case because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
imagine police conduct which would infringe on a separate right of a defendant
already predisposed to committing the crime for which he is accused. Note that
his predisposition alone will deprive him of the entrapment defense under
current federal practice.136
Second, in Rochin,137 it is clear that Justice Frankfurter did not base his
decision to reverse the conviction of the defendant on a separate protected right
of the defendant.' 38 Instead, he went to great lengths to describe his abhorrence
12 7 ld. at 432 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
128 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
129 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
13 0 Id. at 676.
131 Id. at 677.
132 Id.
133 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
134 Id. at 490.
135 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1423.
136 See Miennan, 356 U.S. at 373; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
137 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
138 Id. at 170.
19951 1589
OHIO STA7ELAWJOURNAL
of the police conduct in the process of obtaining the evidence. 139 Though
certainly the privacy of the defendant had been severely compromised, it was
the repugnant conduct of the police to which he concluded that "force so brutal
and so offensive to human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect"
offended due process. 140 Because it would have been easy for the Court to have
decided this case solely on privacy grounds, the fact that a due process
approach was adopted seems to clearly indicate that Rochin endorsed a due
process right of the individual to be free from outrageous governmental
conduct in the area of criminal law enforcement.
Tucker illustrates an important misinterpretation of the Hampton decision:
due process does not exist simply to protect other "independent" rights, but is
instead a right in and of itself. It functions for all persons to provide the "most
comprehensive protection of liberties .... " 141 The functioning of due process,
including its guarantees of fairness in relations between the government and
individuals, does not require any separate violation of rights by police
misconduct.
It is worth noting, and expanding upon, that the Tucker court conceded that
Hampton was by no measure the death knell for the due process defense. 142 In
fact, the numbers would seem to indicate a fairly strong approval for the
defense.143 This case provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to broach
the subject of the due process defense as applied to a criminally predisposed
defendant.
Writing for a plurality in Hampton, Justice Rehnquist revisited his
comments in Russell which suggest that the due process defense was alive and
well. 144 By definition, the due process defense would apply in a like manner to
both the criminally predisposed and those mentally coerced into criminal
activity. However, Rehnquist and the plurality retreated from this supposition,
proposing instead that the sole protector of the accused would be the
139 Id. at 166-67.
140 Id. at 174.
141 Id. at 170.
142 Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1423.
143 The Court divided on the issue of a due process defense. The plurality, composed
of three Justices (Rehnquist, Burger, and White) apparently rejected the due process defense
for a predisposed defendant, without regard to the nature of the governmental misconduct.
Five Justices (Powell, Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart) would permit a due
process defense when government agents participate in a crime which "reach[es] a
demonstrable level of outrageousness... ." Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
144 Id. at 489-90.
1590 [Vol. 56:1571
TAKINGAIMATDUE PROCESS
entrapment defense.145 Under the subjective analysis, predisposition is fatal to
the entrapment defense. 146
In so doing, Rehnquist closed the door that he had opened in Russell. The
opportunity to plead the due process defense provided in Russell was eliminated
when Rehnquist declared that the defense's "limitations" are triggered only by
governmental misconduct which "violates some protected right of the
defendant."147 In the absence of such a violation, illegal or outrageous activity
of a governmental agent should not be handled by dismissing the cause of
action against a culpable defendant, but by leveling separate charges against the
agent.148 Arriving at this conclusion apparently renders due process as
adversely affected by predisposition as the entrapment defense.149
However, in a concurring opinion, Justices Powell and Blackmun took
exception to the plurality's objective of denying a due process defense to any
predisposed defendant.150 Justice Powell, the author of the separate opinion,
grounded this decision in light of the fact that neither Russell nor any other case
involving entrapment required such a holding. 151 Nor, he argued, had the
Supreme Court confronted the issue in any form other than "contraband
offenses." 15 2 Under these conditions, Powell refused to conclude "that an
analysis other than one limited to predisposition would never be appropriate
under due process principles." 153
Justice Powell was cognizant of the hazards involved in setting standards of
conduct for other governmental agencies. However, he did not believe that
"these difficulties... justif[ied] the plurality's absolute rule." 154 Fundamental
fairness will be at the core of these decisions, and the Supreme Court's cases
were "replete with examples of judgments as to when such fairness has been
denied an accused in light of all the circumstances. " 155 In concluding, Powell
reiterated that the absence of a "sharply defined standard against which to make
these judgments [was not] a sufficient reason to deny the federal judiciary's
power to make them when warranted by the circumstances." 156 The conduct
will be more readily identified by creating a standard which requires "[p]olice




149 See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 377-79 (3d Cir. 1978).150 Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495.
151 Id
152 d at 493.
153 Id. (footnote omitted).
154 Id. at 494 n.6.
155 Id. at 494-95 n.6.
156 Id. at 495 n.6.
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overinvolvement in crime... [which will] reach a demonstrable level of
outrageousness before it could bar conviction." 157
In addition to promoting the objective test for entrapment, the dissent
agreed that the due process defense had not been extinguished by the Russell
decision. 158 Because Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision, the
number of Justices actively opposed to the due process defense was limited to
three.
VII. CONCLUSION
When defining the degree of misconduct necessary to trigger the due
process defense, the courts must take care not to nullify its effectiveness1 59 by
requiring overly oppressive measures. It is simply unreasonable to conclude
that Justice Powell meant to equate "[p]olice overinvolvement in crime
[that] ... reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness" 160 solely to police
brutality. In modem day society, police must be creative in their crime fighting
methods. Government agents more often coerce criminal activity by promises
of profit or advantage than by physical persuasion. In the same light,
government involvement in the planning, execution, and control of crime can
become unconstitutionally intrusive without ever attaining the level of brutality
involving "physical or psychological coercion that 'shocks the conscience.' 161
Criminal activity, by its very nature, will take place in secret and prove
difficult to detect. To counter it, we fully anticipate the need for law
enforcement agencies to resort to "stealth and strategy" as "necessary weapons
in [their] arsenal ..... 162 At the same time, these agents and the courts must
keep in mind that marginal involvement in crime is not the same as creation,
control, and direction of that same crime.
The entrapment defense, whether applied with the subjective methodology
favored by the Supreme Court, or objective methodology favored by many
state courts, is incapable of serving the same goals as the due process defense.
The subjective test fails to protect the defendant who is predisposed to a crime,
but has been the victim of police misconduct which shocks the conscience of
the court. The objective test fails because the doctrine simply is not as
157 Id. at 495 n.7.
158 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall. Id. at 495.
159 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (comparing the misconduct necessary to implementation
of a "rack and the screw").
160 Hwmton, 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
161 United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476 n.13 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, J.,
separate opinion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983).162 herman, 356 U.S. at 372.
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expansive in its application as the due process defense. It does not protect a
suspect from police misconduct which offends the notions of decency and fair
play. Ultimately, the due process defense exists, not for the protection of the
defendant, but to protect the fundamental maxims of the Constitution and the
integrity of the judiciary. 163
163 United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
1995] 1593

